Since the introduction of blockchains, several new database systems and applications have tried to employ them. At the core of such blockchain designs are Byzantine Fault-Tolerant (bft) consensus protocols that enable designing systems that are resilient to failures and malicious behavior. Unfortunately, existing bft protocols seem unsuitable for usage in database systems due to their high computational costs, high communication costs, high client latencies, and/or reliance on trusted components and clients.
INTRODUCTION
Since the introduction of blockchains, several applications have tried to employ technologies associated with them [77, 107] . This shift has also touched the database community, where newer blockchain databases and data management techniques are emerging [3, 35, 40, 78] . In specific, blockchains support a paradigm shift in favor of fault-resilient database systems. This shift is also a consequence of recent cyberattacks such as WannaCry and NotPetya that disrupted critical data-based services in health care and container shipping, and had catastrophic negative impacts on the economy [45, 80, 100] . Blockchain technology serves in this direction as it facilitates resilient data processing that can deal with software bugs, hardware failures, and malicious attacks.
At the core of any blockchain database lies a traditional Byzantine Fault-Tolerant (bft) consensus protocol. These consensus protocols are used to order client requests among a set of replicas, some of which could be byzantine, such that all good replicas reach agreement on the order for these client requests. It is easy to see that these bft consensus protocols are the fault-resilient counterparts of the classical two-phase and three-phase commit protocols [44, 48, 97] . While a commit protocol helps to make a distributed database consistent and recover from failures, a consensus protocol helps to provide continuous service, even during malicious attacks.
To achieve consensus among their replicas, several of the recent blockchain databases and applications [3, 35, 40, 78, 79] still depend on the classical Pbft protocol [15] , even though, Pbft requires three phases of communication, of which two necessitate quadratic communication. This dependence is partly due to time-tested safe design of Pbft and due to the limiting designs of other bft protocols. Indeed, even when there are no failures, current bft consensus protocols such as Zyzzyva, Pbft, and HotStuff [15, 16, 60, 61, 111] incur high client latencies due to the many phases of communication (Pbft, HotStuff, HotStuff-ts), require cryptographic primitives with high computational costs (Zyzzyva, HotStuff, HotStuffts), require a large amount of communication (Pbft, HotStuff), cannot handle any failure and require reliable clients (Zyzzyva), or require threshold signatures for which no tested implementation exists (HotStuff-ts).
In this paper, we introduce the Proof-of-Execution consensus protocol (PoE) that achieves low latency and high throughput with moderate communication costs and without depending on clients or expensive cryptographic primitives. A full comparison of the normal-case operations of PoE and other popular bft protocols can be found in Figure 1 .
At the core of PoE is an algorithm that allows replicas to process messages out-of-order and facilitates speculative execution of client transactions. Via the use of out-of-order processing, PoE decouples ordering from execution and eliminates various bottlenecks associated with sequential consensus protocols. With the help of speculative execution, a replica can execute transaction before reaching a guarantee on the agreement, thus, reducing perceived client latencies and communication. If the primary is non-faulty, then PoE ensures an inexpensive and reliable consensus. If the primary is malicious, speculative execution can require a replica to revert any speculatively-executed transactions. The design of PoE still guarantees that all executions detectable by clients are preserved, this by using a special-purpose view-change protocol. Hence, a malicious primary can never prevent replicas from reaching a consistent state.
In specific, we make the following contributions:
(1) We introduce the PoE consensus protocol, a novel bft protocol that uses speculative execution and allows out-of-order processing without relying on clients. (2) We prove that PoE guarantees safety: it replicates a unique sequence of order-decisions among all replicas and ensures that the clients can reliably detect when their transactions are executed, this independent of any malicious behavior by any of the replicas. (3) We show that PoE guarantees liveness: whenever the network provides reliable communication, PoE continues successful operation, this independent of any malicious behavior by any of the replicas. (4) To guarantee safety and liveness, we introduce a safe viewchange protocol to deal with malicious primaries in the presence of speculative execution. (5) To validate our vision of using PoE in blockchain databases, we implement PoE in our efficient ResilientDB framework. 1 We also implemented other state-of-the-art bft protocols in ResilientDB (Zyzzyva, Pbft, and HotStuff), and evaluate PoE against these bft protocols using the YCSB benchmark [23] . Our experiments focus on the throughput and latency of these protocols in the fault-free case and in case of failures (single replica failure, multiple replica failures, primary failure). We show that PoE achieves up to 86% more throughput than existing bft protocols.
BACKGROUND AND APPLICATIONS
The interests in blockchains emerged after the rise of Bitcoin-the first blockchain-based cryptocurrency [77] . Bitcoin and its peers promoted an environment of open-membership, where any node can act as a replica and can participate in consensus [47, 107] . To do so, these applications employed the Proof-of-Work (PoW) [52] consensus algorithm, which has been shown to yield low throughput, high client latencies, consume much energy, and suffer from critical attacks [27, 86, 102, 105] . This led to the rise of permissioned blockchains, where only a select group of nodes can act as replicas and participate in the consensus [29, 47] . These permissioned blockchains operate in a more secure setting, which allows them to provide higher throughput at lower cost. This enables permissioned blockchains as a resolve for challenges in food production [39] , energy production and energy trading [88] , and managing health care [9, 43, 54] . Existing blockchain databases and data management applications fall under the category of permissioned blockchain systems [3, 35, 40, 78] . Like any other database system, a blockchain database system requires both availability and consistency. To achieve consistency, they employ bft consensus protocols. To be able to deal with big workloads without making clients wait, they need availability with high throughput. In Figure 1 , we illustrate how state-of-the-art bft protocols fall short in achieving these requirements. Hence, the design of our PoE protocol is in order.
We also examined recent blockchain papers in the database community to analyze what is the right size of a permissioned blockchain system [3, 29, 35, 78, 91, 94, 109] . In our study, we found that almost all the works employ up to 16 replicas, and only a couple of works used up to 32 replicas. Further, we saw that some of these works used sharding to scale their applications or database [26, 35] . Sharding is an interesting data-partitioning technique, but it is very expensive when the transactions require access to multiple partitions. With such multi-partition transactions, the throughput can be as low as 2000 txns/s [26] . Another key observations we had from this study was that a majority of these works employed consensus based on Pbft protocol and none of these works crossed a throughput of 20K txns/s. These systems can greatly benefit from our PoE consensus protocol, as our evaluation (Section 5) shows that PoE can reach a throughput of 110K txns/s on 16 replicas and 70K txns/s on 32 replicas.
PROOF-OF-EXECUTION
PoE follows the standard primary-backup design [82] , where one replica is elected the primary and the other replicas act as backups. The primary is responsible for proposing client transactions, that need to be executed, to all the backups. In PoE, each backup replica speculatively executes the client transactions with the hope that primary is behaving correctly. In the normal case, speculative execution helps to expedite execution of transactions, thereby reducing latencies for clients and overall communication in comparison to non-speculative designs (e.g., Pbft). When any malicious behavior is detected, the backups can recover by reverting transactions. Independent of malicious behavior, PoE ensures that all non-faulty replicas eventually reach a unique common sequence of executed transactions (consensus). PoE
System model and notations
Before providing a full description of our PoE protocol, we present the system model we use and the relevant notations. We model a system as a tuple (R, C), in which R is a set of replicas that process client requests and C is a set of clients making requests. We assign each replica r ∈ R a unique identifier id(r) with 0 ≤ id(r) < |R|. We write F ⊆ R to denote the set of Byzantine replicas that can behave in arbitrary, possibly coordinated and malicious, manners. We use notation N F = R \ F to denote the set of nonfaulty replicas in R. We assume that the non-faulty replicas behave in accordance to the protocol and are deterministic: on identical inputs, all non-faulty replicas must produce identical outputs. We do not make any assumptions on the clients: all client can be malicious without affecting PoE.
We write n = |R|, f = |F |, and nf = |N F | to denote the number of replicas, faulty replicas, and non-faulty replicas, respectively. We assume that nf > 2f, which is a minimal requirement to deal with Byzantine behavior when not relying on digital signatures [30, 31] . We also employ a collision-resistant cryptographic hash function D(·) that can map an arbitrary value v to a constant-sized digest D(v) [56, 75] . We assume that it is practically impossible to find
We assume authenticated communication: byzantine replicas are able to impersonate each other, but no replica can impersonate a non-byzantine replica. Hence, on receipt of a message m from replica r ∈ R, one can determine that r did send m if r F ; and one can only determine that m was sent by a non-faulty replica if r ∈ N F . Authenticated communication is a minimal requirement to deal with Byzantine behavior, as otherwise faulty replicas can impersonate all non-faulty replicas. We use message authentication codes [56, 75] to achieve authenticated communication.
Next, we define the consensus provided by PoE.
Definition 3.1. Let (R, C) be a system. A single run of any consensus protocol should satisfy the following requirements:
Termination. Each non-faulty replica in the set N F executes transactions. Non-divergence. All non-faulty replicas execute the same transaction.
Termination is typically referred to as liveness, whereas non-divergence is typically referred to as safety. In PoE, execution is speculative: replicas can execute and revert transactions. To provide safety, PoE provides speculative non-divergence instead of non-divergence:
Speculative non-divergence. If f + 1 non-faulty replicas (a majority) accept and execute the same transaction T , then all the non-faulty replicas will revert any other accepted and executed transactions, and will eventually accept and execute T .
To provide safety, we do not need any other assumptions on communication or on the behavior of clients. Due to well-known impossibility results for asynchronous consensus [11, 12, 38, 42] , we can only provide liveness in periods of reliable bounded-delay communication during which all messages sent by non-faulty replicas will arrive at their destination within some maximum delay.
Normal-case algorithm of PoE
The PoE protocol operates in views v = 0, 1, . . . . In view v, the replica r with id(r) = v mod n is elected as the primary. It is the job of the primary to coordinate replication and execution of client transactions. As the first step of this process, clients send transactions to the primary.
Consider a view v with primary p and a client c that wants execution of a transaction T . In PoE, the client c initiates execution by sending T to p. To assure that malicious primaries cannot forge transactions, the client signs T with its private key. We denote such signed messages by ⟨T ⟩ c . To initiate replication and execution of T as the k-th transaction, the primary proposes T to all replicas by broadcasting the message propose(⟨T ⟩ c , v, k).
After a replica r receives a propose message from p, it checks whether at least nf ≥ 2f + 1 other replicas also received the same proposal from p. This check assures r that at least nf −f ≥ f +1 nonfaulty replicas received the same proposal, which helps to achieve speculative non-divergence. To perform this check, each replica agrees to support the first proposal propose(⟨T ⟩ c , v, k) it receives from the primary by broadcasting a message support(D(⟨T ⟩ c ), v, k) to all replicas. The replica r also logs this support decision as Support r (⟨T ⟩ c , k, v). After this broadcast, each replica waits until it receives support messages, identical to the message it sent, from nf distinct replicas. If r receives these messages, it view-commits to T as the k-th transaction in view v. The replica R logs this view-commit decision as VCommit r (⟨T ⟩ c , k, v).
After r view-commits to T , r schedules T for speculative execution as the k-th transaction of view v. Consequently, T will be executed by r after all preceding transactions are executed. We write Execute r (⟨T ⟩ c , k, v) to denote this execution. After execution, r informs the client of the order of execution and of any execution result r via a message inform(D(⟨T ⟩ c ), v, k, r ).
A client considers its transaction successfully executed after it receives identical inform(D(⟨T ⟩ c ), v, k, r ) messages from nf distinct replicas. This guarantees that at least nf − f ≥ f + 1 non-faulty replicas executed this transaction as the k-th transaction. Hence, PoE's speculative non-divergence guarantees that eventually all non-faulty replicas will accept and execute T as the k-th transaction.
If the client does not know the current primary or does not get any timely response for its requests, then it can broadcast its request to all replicas. The non-faulty replicas will then forward this request to the current primary (if it is not yet executed) and ensure that the primary initiates successful proposal of this request in a timely manner.
The communication of the normal-case algorithm of PoE is sketched in Figure 2 and the full pseudo-code of the algorithm can be found in Figure 3 .
To prove correctness of PoE in all cases, we will need the following technical safety-related property of view-commits. Proposition 3.2. Let r i , i ∈ {1, 2}, be two non-faulty replicas that view-committed to ⟨T i ⟩ c i as the k-th transaction of view v (VCommit r (⟨T ⟩ c , k, v)). We have
Proof. Replica r i only view-committed to ⟨T i ⟩ c i after r i received identical messages support(D(⟨T ⟩ c ), v, k) from a set S i of nf distinct replicas (Line 14 of Figure 3 ). Let X i = S i \ F be the non-faulty replicas in S i . We have |S i | = nf and |F | ≤ f. Hence, |X i | ≥ nf − f. The non-faulty replicas in T i will only send a single Client-role (used by client c to request transaction T ) : 1: Send ⟨T ⟩ c to the primary p. 2: Await receipt of messages inform( ⟨T ⟩ c , v, k, r ) from nf replicas. 3: Considers T executed, with result r , as the k -th transaction.
Primary-role (running at the primary p of view v, id(p) = v mod n) : 4: Let view v start after execution of the k -th transaction. 5: while p is the primary do 6: p awaits receipt of message ⟨T ⟩ c from client c.
7:
Broadcast propose( ⟨T ⟩ c , v, k ) to all replicas. 8: k := k + 1. 9: end while Backup-role (running at every replica r ∈ R.) :
10: event r receives message m := propose( ⟨T ⟩ c , v, k) such that:
(1) v is the current view;
(2) m is sent by the primary of v; and (3) r did not accept a k -th proposal in v do 11:
12:
Broadcast support(D( ⟨T ⟩ c ), v, k ) to all replicas. 13 : end event 14: event r receives nf messages support(D( ⟨T ⟩ c ), v, k ) such that:
(1) each message was sent by a distinct replica; and
19:
Let r be the result of execution of T (if there is any result). 20 : . If ⟨T 1 ⟩ c 1 ⟨T 2 ⟩ c 2 , then X 1 and X 2 must not overlap. Hence, |X 1 ∪ X 2 | ≥ 2(nf − f). As n = nf + f, this simplifies to 3f ≥ n, which contradicts our assumption that n > 3f. Hence, we conclude
Next, we show that the normal-case algorithm of PoE provides speculative consensus when the primary is non-faulty and communication is reliable. Proof. Following the normal-case algorithm of PoE (Figure 3 ), the primary sends propose(⟨T ⟩ c , v, k) to all replicas (Line 7). In response, all nf non-faulty replicas will broadcast support(D(⟨T ⟩ c ), v, k) (Line 12). As there are at most f < nf faulty replicas, the faulty replicas can only forge up to f invalid support messages. Consequently, each non-faulty replica will only receive the message support(D(⟨T ⟩ c ), v, k) from at least nf distinct replicas and every non-faulty replica will view-commit T (Line 14). As the first k − 1 transactions have already been executed, every non-faulty replica will execute T . As all non-faulty replicas behave deterministic, execution will yield the same result r across all non-faulty replicas. Hence, when the non-faulty replicas inform c, they do so by all sending identical messages inform(D(⟨T ⟩ c ), v, k, r ) to c (Line 17-Line 20). As all nf non-faulty replicas executed T , we have nondivergent execution. Finally, as there are at most f < nf faulty replicas, the faulty replicas can only forge up to f invalid inform messages. Consequently, the client c will only receive the message inform(D(⟨T ⟩ c ), v, k, r ) from at least nf distinct replicas, and will conclude that T is executed yielding result r (Line 3). □ Next, we look at how PoE deals with failures. Theorem 3.3 shows that PoE provides consensus under normal-case behavior. If the normal-case behavior of PoE is interrupted, then from Theorem 3.3 we know that there are only two possible causes: faulty primary and unreliable communication.
Example 3.4. A malicious primary can attempt to affect PoE by not conforming to the normal-case algorithm in several ways, e.g.:
(1) By sending proposals for different transactions to different non-faulty replicas. In this case, Proposition 3.2 guarantees that at most a single such proposed transaction will get viewcommitted by any non-faulty replica. (2) By keeping some non-faulty replicas in the dark by not sending proposals to them. In this case, the remaining non-faulty replicas can still end up view-committing the transactions as long as at least nf − f non-faulty replicas receive proposals: the faulty replicas in F can take over the role of up to f non-faulty replicas left in the dark (giving the false illusion that the non-faulty replicas in the dark are malicious). (3) By preventing execution by not proposing a k-th transaction, even though transactions following the k-th transaction are being proposed. We notice that when the network is unreliable and messages do not get delivered (or not on time), then the behavior of a non-faulty primary can match that of the malicious primary of the second and third case.
If communication is unreliable, then there is no way to guarantee continuous service. Hence, replicas assume failure of the current primary if the normal-case behavior of PoE is interrupted. To deal with such a failure, replicas will replace the primary. The design of PoE is such that the primary replacement during periods of unreliable communication does not affect the correctness of the protocol. The replacement of primaries is done via the view-change algorithm, which we introduce next. Figure 4 and the full pseudo-code of the algorithm can be found in Figure 5 . Next, we discuss each step in full detail. Figure 5 , Line 1). PoE requires that each replica r detects the failure of primary in the following two ways:
The view-change algorithm
(1) r timeouts while expecting normal-case operations toward executing a client request. E.g., when r forwards a client request to the current primary, and the current primary fails to propose this request on time.
(2) r receives vc-request messages indicating that the primary of v failed from f + 1 distinct replicas. As at most f of these messages can come from faulty replicas, at least one other non-faulty replica q must have detected a failure. In this case, r joins the view-change ( Figure 5 , Line 6). r halts the normal-case algorithm of Figure 3 for view v.
3:
4:
Broadcast vc-reqest(v, E) to all replicas. 5: end event 6: event r receives f + 1 messages vc-reqest(v i , E i ) such that (1) each message was sent by a distinct replica; and
r detects failure of the primary (join). 8 : end event vc-ack (used by replica r to acknowledge view-change requests) : 9: event r receives message vc-reqest(v, E) from q such that:
(1) E includes a consecutive sequence of transactions (there exists a maximum value k m , such that for each k , 0 ≤ k ≤ k m , there is a transaction t k claimed to be executed in view w . Broadcast vc-ack(v, id(q), D(vc-reqest(v, E))) to all replicas. 11: end event nv-propose (used by replica p ′ to become the new primary) :
(1) these messages are sent by a set S , |S | = nf, of distinct replicas; 15 : end event nv-ack (used by replica r to move to a new view) :
if m is a valid new-view proposal (see Section 3.3.4) then 18: Broadcast nv-ack(v + 1, D(m)) to all replicas. 19: Await receipt of messages nv-ack(v + 1, D(m)) from nf replicas. 20: Move into view v + 1 with state E ′ (see Section 3.3.5). transaction summarized in E is consistent with the view-commit decisions made by r.
Consider a view-commit decision VCommit r (⟨T ⟩ c , k, w) of replica r. This replica requires that every entry (w ′ , k, t) ∈ E that has the same order k must match to its view-commit decision. This is done by checking whether w = w ′ and t = ⟨T ⟩ c (Figure 5, Line 9 ). Furthermore, R verifies whether E contains a full sequence of transactions. If all these checks hold, then r acknowledges the received view-change request by broadcasting vc-ack(v, id(q), D(vc-reqest(v, E))).
3.3.3
Proposing the new view. To start view v + 1, the new primary p ′ (with id(p ′ ) = (v + 1) mod n) needs to propose a new view by determining a valid final list of already-executed transactions. To do so, p ′ awaits until it receives sufficient information. In specific, p ′ waits for a set S ⊆ R, |S | ≥ nf, of distinct replicas from which p ′ received: (i) view-change requests, and (ii) for each of these viewchange requests, matching acknowledgments from each replica in the set S ( Figure 5 , Line 12). Such a set S is guaranteed to exist when the communication is reliable, as all non-faulty replicas will participate in the view-change algorithm.
Each replica q i ∈ S, 1 ≤ i ≤ nf, would have included a summary E i in their view-change requests. Based on these summaries, p ′ proposes a valid final state for view v (and all previous views). This valid state consists of E 1 ∪ . . . ∪ E nf , which is the union of all transactions summarized in the view-change requests of replicas in S.
For validation purposes, the new primary p ′ also includes a set V , which contains details of the replicas whose view-change requests were used to create the new-view proposal ( Figure 5 , Line 13). Finally, p ′ makes this new-view proposal by broadcasting We notice that each replica will eventually receive all viewchange requests and acknowledgements sent by non-faulty replicas and the new primary p ′ must have used at least nf − f ≥ f + 1 view-change requests of non-faulty replicas. Hence, if p ′ did not use the view-change request of r when constructing m, then p ′ must have used at least nf − f view-change requests that r also received. In this case, r can only partially validate whether m is consistent with each of these nf − f view-change requests vc-reqest(v, E) by checking whether E ⊆ E ′ . If these consistency checks succeed, then r acknowledges the new view. Otherwise, if these consistency checks fail, then r detects failure of p ′ .
To acknowledge a validated new-view proposal m, r broadcasts nv-ack(v+1, D(m)) to all other replicas ( Figure 5 , Line 18). To ensure that the new primary p ′ did send the same new-view proposal to a majority of the non-faulty replicas, r waits until it receives nf acknowledgements for m. Once it receives these acknowledgements, replica r moves to the new view.
Move to the new view.
After entering the new view proposed by the new primary p ′ , the replica r resumes the normal-case algorithm of Figure 3 in view v + 1. First, r view-commits and executes the set of transactions in E ′ as the first |E ′ | transactions of view v + 1. Notice that replica r can skip execution of any transactions in E ′ it already executed. If r executed transactions not in E ′ before the view-change, then r needs to rollback these transactions before it can proceed executing requests in view v + 1.
At the core of the correctness of PoE, under all conditions, is that no replica will rollback client requests ⟨T ⟩ c that are considered executed by client c. Next, we show that this core property is maintained: Proposition 3.5. Let ⟨T ⟩ c be a client request that c considers executed as the k-th transaction of view v. Every view-change from view v to view v ′ , v ′ > v, will include T as the k-th transaction.
Proof. As client c considers ⟨T ⟩ c executed as the k-th transaction of view v, there must be a set A of |A| = nf distinct replicas that sent identical inform-messages to c (Figure 3 , Line 3). Let B = A\ F be the set of non-faulty replicas in A. As there are at most f faulty replicas, we have |B| ≥ nf − f. Let r ∈ B be a non-faulty replica that executed ⟨T ⟩ c . We will show that every new view that r enters will include T as the k-th transaction.
Before entering a new view v ′ , r received a proposal m = nv-propose(v ′ , E ′ , V ) from replica p ′ with id(p ′ ) = v ′ mod n. Replica r also received messages nv-ack(v ′ , D(m)) from a set C of |C | = nf distinct replicas ( Figure 5 , Line [16] [17] [18] [19] . Let D = C \ F be the set of non-faulty replicas in C and let W = {q ∈ N F | (id(q), d) ∈ V } be the set of non-faulty replicas whose information p ′ claimed to have used to construct m. We have |D| ≥ nf − f and |W | ≥ nf − f, which implies D ∩ W ∅.
Let q ∈ (D ∩ W ). As (id(q), d) ∈ V , q must have received m and must have performed a full validation of m before sending an acknowledgement (see Section 3.3.4). The construction of m, consequently, must be based on valid view-changes provided by the replicas in W . We have |W | ≥ nf − f and |B| ≥ nf − f, which implies W ∩ B ∅. Hence, at least a single non-faulty replica in B, that executed ⟨T ⟩ c , was consulted when constructing m and, hence,
Furthermore, the correctness of PoE also requires that every non-faulty replica that enters a new view, does so using the same new-view proposal. Using the same proof technique as in the proof of Proposition 3.2, we can prove that this requirement holds:
Correctness of PoE
Having presented all essential parts of the PoE protocol, the normalcase algorithm of Figure 2 Theorem 3.7. PoE is a speculative consensus protocol that always guarantees safety via speculative non-divergence and guarantees liveness in periods of reliable bounded-delay communication.
Proof. Safety via speculative non-divergence follows directly from Proposition 3.5. For the view-change process, each replica will start with a timeout δ and double this timeout after each viewchange (exponential backoff). When communication becomes reliable, exponential back off guarantees that all replicas will eventually view-change to the same view at the same time. After this point, a non-faulty replica will become primary in at most f view-changes. After these view-changes, Theorem 3.3 guarantees liveness. □
Fine-tuning and optimizations
To keep presentation simple, we did not include all possible optimizations in the protocol description. We can reduce the number of messages sent and received by all replicas in the following ways:
(1) All replicas omit sending messages to themselves.
(2) The primary only sends propose messages, which all replicas also interpret as support messages. Hence, the receipt of propose(⟨T ⟩ c , v, k) from the primary also counts as receipt of support(D(⟨T ⟩ c ), v, k) from the primary. With these optimizations in place, in the normal-case algorithm of PoE, each replica-including the primary-only sends a single message to all the other replicas for every proposed client request. The view-change algorithm of Section 3.3 will send very large messages if many transactions have already been proposed. To limit the size of these messages, we utilize a standard periodic checkpoint protocol to exchange state information outside of the scope of the view-change algorithm (see, e.g., [14] [15] [16] ). With these checkpoints in place, the view-change algorithm only needs to exchange information on transactions proposed after the last checkpoint.
RESILIENTDB FABRIC
Consensus protocols lie at the core of any blockchain application, including resilient databases, and their efficiency heavily impact the throughput of such applications. However, the underlying implementation for these consensus protocols also substantially affect throughput. Taking this into account, we have designed Re-silientDB, a high-throughput permissioned blockchain fabric. Using ResilientDB, we wish to realize the following goals: (i) implement and test different consensus protocols; (ii) balance the tasks done by a replica through a a parallel pipelined architecture; (iii) minimize the cost of consensus through batching client transactions; and (iv) enable a secure and efficient ledger for use in resilient database systems.
(1) Multi-Threading and Deep Pipelining. ResilientDB envisions a client-server architecture, where clients send their transactions to servers for processing (see Figure 6 ). All the servers are a replica of each other, with one replica acting as the primary, while others perform the tasks of a backup. Clients and replicas employ the transport layer to communicate with each other. Replicas use the ResilientDB's storage layer to maintain all the metadata and its local copy of ledger. It is at the execution layer where replicas run the PoE consensus protocol and execute the corresponding In ResilientDB, we also make a distinction while deciding on the best software architecture for a replica. Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the threads and pipelines at the primary and backup replicas, respectively. With each replica we associate multiple input and output threads. We designate one input-thread to receive client requests, while two other input-threads receive messages from other replicas. ResilientDB balances the message sending tasks between the two output-threads by assigning equal clients and replicas to each output-thread. This allows us to associate a distinct output-queue with each output-thread.
(2) Client Batching. During our formal description, we assumed that a client sends one transaction and waits for its response before sending another request. This assumption is not practical (e.g., one client could have multiple transactions for transferring money to different accounts). Hence, ResilientDB allows each client c to batch multiple transactions in one request message ⟨T ⟩ c (where T now represents a set of transactions) and to send such a batch to the primary replica.
(3) Modeling a Primary Replica. At each replica, we reduce the cost of consensus by employing batching. When the primary replica receives a batch of transactions from the client, it treats it as a single request. The input-thread at the primary assigns a sequence number to each incoming client batch and enqueues it in the batch-queue. This batch-queue is accessed by multiple batchingthreads, which compete among themselves to fetch the next available client batch. ResilientDB implements the batch-queue as a lock-free queue to avoid contention. Each batching-thread verifies if the dequeued client batch is well-formed. If this is the case, then the batching-thread constructs a propose message and puts this message in the output-queue. Each batching-thread also creates the digest for its client request.
A primary replica may also receive messages from backup replicas. When the input-thread receives a support message, it enqueues that message in the work-queue. The work-queue is accessed by a single worker-thread. The worker-thread dequeues a message and checks if it is well-formed. It continues collecting support messages corresponding to a propose message until the count reaches nf − f − 1 and then informs the execute-thread to execute the client transactions. (4) Modeling a Backup Replica: When the input-thread at a backup replica receives a propose message from the primary, it enqueues that message in the work-queue. The worker-thread dequeues a propose message and checks if the message is wellformed. Next, it creates a support message and enqueues it in the output-queue. The output-thread sends the support message to all the other replicas. When a backup replica receives a support message from other replicas, then it follows the same steps as stated earlier for the primary replica.
(5) Execution: In ResilientDB, at each replica we have an execute-thread that executes all the requests in accordance with the normal case algorithm. Once the execution is complete, the execution-thread creates an inform message and places it in the output-queue for the output-thread to send it to the client.
(6) Chain Management: Although PoE can be used to achieve byzantine fault-tolerant consensus in any fault-tolerant replicated application, our aim is to facilitate its use in our ResilientDB fabric. We now explain how our we efficiently maintain a blockchain across different replicas.
A blockchain is an immutable ledger, where blocks are chained as a linked-list. An i-th block can be represented as:
Here, the block B i contains the sequence number (k) of the client request, the digest (d) of the request, the view number v, and the hash of the previous block, H (B i−1 ). Figure 9 represents a blockchain maintained by replicas. In ResilientDB, prior to any consensus, we require the first primary replica to create a genesis block [47] .
Genesis block acts as the first block in the blockchain and contains some basic data. We use the hash of the identity of the initial primary, as this information is available to each participating replicas (eliminating the need for any extra communication to exchange this block).
After the genesis block, each replica can independently create the next block in the blockchain. As stated above, each block corresponds to some batch of transactions. A block is only created by the execute-thread once it completes executing a batch of transactions. To create a block, the execute-thread hashes the previous block in the blockchain and creates a new block. These hashes can be computationally expensive. Hence, an alternative approach is to store the proof-of-accepting the k-th request in the k-th block. In PoE, such a proof consists of the nf identical support messages from distinct replicas for this k-th request.
What is the use of these blocks? These blocks help a failed replica to recover its state. A recovering replica (either a failed replica or a replica left in the dark by a malicious primary) can ask other replicas for the blocks that have been added to the chain. Due to the structure of these blocks, the recovering replica can verify the validity of the received blocks, even if it only receives blocks from malicious replicas. (7) Cryptographic Constructs: PoE also employs cryptographic constructs for mitigating attacks by byzantine replicas. To do so, ResilientDB uses a combination of CMAC and AES [56] to provide authenticated communication between replicas. We require clients to sign their Request messages using ED25519-based digital signatures, such that these requests can be forwarded by the primary, but cannot be forged. An alternate approach is to require clients to send their requests to all the replicas, but such an approach increases the message complexity of the system and requires non-faulty clients.
To create message digests and for hashing purposes, we use the SHA256 algorithm. We import implementations of all these constructs from the Crypto++ library [22] . (8) Other protocols: Apart from PoE, we also implement Pbft, Zyzzyva and HotStuff in our ResilientDB framework. Pbft: is a three phase bft consensus protocol. The first two phases for Pbft are identical to PoE, except that execution does not happen at the end of second phase. Once a worker-thread in Pbft gets nf − f − 1 Support message, it sends a Commit message to all the replicas (instead of informing the execute-thread). When an inputthread receives a Commit message from other replicas, it places it in the work-queue. The worker-thread waits for nf Commit messages and then informs the execute-thread to execute the client request.
Hence, Pbft has an extra phase of O(n 2 ) communication. The client waits for only f + 1 responses before marking the request complete.
Zyzzyva: provides an optimization for Pbft in case of no failures. Although Zyzzyva is unsafe [2] , we implement it in ResilientDB to study its performance with or without failures. When the workerthread at a backup replica receives a client request from the primary, it directly informs the execute-thread. The execute-thread executes the request and replies to the client. Hence, replicas do not wait to confirm: (i) if other replicas also got the same request from the primary, and (ii) if the order for client request is same for all the replicas. This forces the client to wait for identical responses from all n replicas. In case the client does not receive n responses, it timeouts and sends a message to all the replicas, after which an expensive client-dependent view-change and recovery protocol is used to figure out the correct outcome. For this view-change protocol, it is required that all messages sent to clients are signed using expensive digital signatures.
HotStuff: As described earlier, HotStuff requires four phases of achieve consensus on a transaction. Furthermore, HotStuff avoids all-to-all replica communication by centralizing the primary as the point of contact. To do so, it splits each phase into two parts (a primary broadcast to all replicas, followed by all replicas responding to the primary). This creates a dependency of each replica on the primary and requires the primary to send proofs of previous phases. These proofs can be generated using expensive threshold signatures (which even the HotStuff authors skip in their paper), or requires the primary to forward each replica's message to every other replica. This also implies that HotStuff needs each of its replicas to sign every messages using digital signatures. Further, HotStuff necessitates change of primary at the end of every third phase, but we permit all of its replicas to act as primaries and work in parallel. In our implementation, we neither require HotStuff to use threshold signatures, nor require its primaries to forward each replica's message to every other replica.
EVALUATION
We now use our ResilientDB framework to evaluate our PoE protocol. We deploy ResilientDB on Amazon AWS and use up to 32 virtual machines of type c5.2xlarge for replicas. These machines have Intel Xeon Skylake SP CPUs with a turbo frequency of up to 3.4GHz. Each of these machines has 8-cores and 32GB memory. We deploy 200K clients on 10 4-core machines. Each clients send its next request once it receives responses for its previous request batch. We run each experiment for 180 seconds: the 60 seconds are warmup, and results are collected over the next 120 seconds. We average our results over three runs.
In each experiment, the workload is provided by the Yahoo Cloud Serving Benchmark (YCSB) [23] . Each client request queries a YCSB table with an active set of 600K records. For our evaluation, we use write queries, as the majority of typical blockchain requests are updates to existing data. Prior to the experiments, each replica is initialized with an identical copy of the YCSB table. The client requests generated by YCSB follow a uniform Zipfian distribution.
We evaluate PoE against three state-of-the-art bft protocols, which are also part of popular blockchain applications: Pbft, Zyzzyva and HotStuff. In the following figures, we use ZYZ to refer to Zyzzyva and HS for HotStuff. The goal of our experiments is to answer the following questions:
(Q1) How does the system performance of PoE compares to the other protocols, under failure of a single replica? (Q2) Is PoE's performance affected by failure of f replicas? Does PoE retains its benefits under a primary failure? (Q3) Does PoE benefits from batching client requests? (Q4) How scalable is PoE on increasing the number of replicas participating in the consensus, in the normal-case?
Impact on Scalability under Failures
The first key question we ask is: how scalable is PoE under primary and replica failures? To answer this question, we measure performance as function of the number of replicas, which we vary between 4 and 32. For these experiments, we employ batching with 100 client requests per batch.
(1) Single Backup Failure: We first run experiments in which not all n replicas participate in consensus. In specific, only 3f replicas will participate. Notice, when n = 4 ⇒ f = 1, n = 8 ⇒ f = 2, n = 16 ⇒ f = 5, and n = 32 ⇒ f = 10. Figures 10a and 10b show, for each consensus protocol, the throughput and average latency attained by the system. We also analyze the results for 99%ile latency, which helps in detecting the delay incurred by the top 1% of client requests.
These graphs affirm our claim that PoE attains higher throughput and incurs lower latency than all the other protocols. Pbft has to perform an extra phase of O(n 2 ) communication, which reduces its throughput. HotStuff, on the other hand, has to complete eight phases (for each client request) and employs digital signatures. This causes a significant decrease in its throughput (even lower than Pbft when using at most 16 replicas). In case of Zyzzyva, a single failure causes the clients to wait for their timer to timeout (n identical responses are needed by a client to mark its request complete), which significantly lowers its throughput (similar limitations of Zyzzyva have been observed in other works, e.g. [20, 21] ). Similar reasoning holds for the higher average and 99%ile latency incurred by Pbft and HotStuff in comparison to PoE. We skip plotting latencies for Zyzzyva, to better scale the graphs (as on average they are at least 4× more than any other protocol). For example, the average latency incurred by Zyzzyva at 4 replicas is 13.24s and at 32 replicas it is 13.88s.
Another important observation is that the throughputs for both PoE and Pbft decrease when increasing the number of replicas, while HotStuff is less affected by increasing the number of replicas. HotStuff receives parallelism benefits, as each of its replicas also acts as a primary. Further, its O(n) communication cost causes it to send and process fewer message in comparison to both PoE and Pbft when increasing the number of replicas. In fact for 32 replicas, HotStuff outperforms Pbft as the high communication complexity of Pbft eliminates any benefits gained from the use of MACs or due to having fewer phases. However, as expected, HotStuff incurs significant 99%ile latency in comparison to other protocols. To summarize, PoE attains up to 40% more throughput (incurs 29% less latency) than Pbft and 130% more throughput (incurs 58% less latency) than HotStuff. When going from 16 to 32 replicas, Pbft has more severe throughput degradation (39%) in comparison to PoE (30%). Figure 10c also shows the total number of messages sent (or received) per second by the system. In our implementation, the Figure 12 : System throughput and latency as a function of the number of requests per batch. We use 16 replicas for consensus and allow at most 3f replicas to be active at any time.
size of a support message is around 250 bytes, while the client request (batch) and client response is around 8 kilobytes. The trends in these graphs follow our preceding discussion. Due to linear message complexity, HotStuff has the least number of messages communicated, while Pbft has two rounds of O(n 2 ) communication, and thus higher message complexity than PoE.
(2) f Backups Failures: We now analyze the throughput of the system when only nf replicas are active and all f faulty replicas have failed. This experiment also helps us to study the case when f of the byzantine replicas decide to ignore the requests from the primary. Figure 11a shows the throughput attained by different protocols. On performing a head-on comparison with previous figures, it can be seen that there is a reduction in the throughput attained by the system for all the protocols. This happens because each replica spends more time to reach consensus for each request: each replica only needs at most nf responses, which, in the previous experiment, could be served by the fastest of the 3f active replicas. Now, each replica has to wait for all responses, even those sent by the slowest replicas. However, the overall trends previously observed remain the same.
(3) Primary Failure: We now measure throughput attained by PoE and Pbft in case of a benign primary failure. For our experiments, we let the primary replica lead the consensus up to 900 transactions and then cause a primary failure. This causes clients to timeout and send requests to other replicas. These replicas forward the request to the primary and wait. Once the replicas timeout, they initiate the view-change protocol, which requires these replicas to aggregate the summary of all the transactions since the last checkpoint. In our experiments, we allow replicas to create checkpoints after every 600 requests. After the New-View message, the new primary manages the consensus as usual. The results are shown in Figure 11b . As is clear from the results, the whole view-change process reduces the system throughput for all protocols, as time is spent in reaching a stable new view. PoE still achieves higher throughput than Pbft (up to 49%), however. For HotStuff, we don't show results, as it does not have a separate phase of primary replacement. For Zyzzyva, which already has very low throughput with non-primary failure, we skip its view-change.
Impact of Batching under Failures
The next key question we ask is: how much does PoE benefit from batching client requests when the system faces a replica failure? To answer this question, we measure performance as function of the number of requests in a batch (the batch-size), which we vary between 10 and 300. For this experiment, we use a system with 16 available replicas, of which 15 participate in consensus (one replica has failed). Figures 12a and 12b show, for each consensus protocol, the throughput and average latency attained by the system. For each protocol, increasing the batch-size also increases throughput, while decreasing the latency. This happens as larger batch-sizes require fewer consensus rounds to complete the exact same set of requests, reducing the cost of ordering and executing the transactions. This not only improves throughput, but also reduces client latencies as clients receive faster responses to their requests. Although increasing the batch-size reduces the consensus rounds, the large message size causes a proportional decrease in throughput (or increase in latency). This is evident from experiments at higher batch-sizes: increasing the batch-size beyound 100 only has minimal impact on the performance for both PoE and Pbft. As in the previous experiments, Zyzzyva yields a significantly lower throughput, as it cannot handle failures. We again skip plotting latencies for Zyzzyva to better scale the graphs (they are, again, on average at least 4× more than any other protocol). To conclude, PoE attains up to 86% more throughput (incurs 44% less latency) than Pbft and 3.5× more throughput (incurs 74% less latency) than HotStuff.
Scalability: Fault-Free
Finally, we further look into the key question how scalable is PoE in the best case (when there are no failures)? To answer this question, we measure the system performance as a function of the number of replicas, which we vary between 4 and 32. For these experiments, we employ batching with 100 client requests per batch. Figures 13a and 13b show, for each consensus protocol, the throughput and average latency attained by the system. These plots help us to bound the maximal throughput that can be attained by different consensus protocols in our system. First, in comparison to the scalability plots in Section 5.1, the throughputs for PoE, Pbft, and HotStuff are slightly higher than their throughputs under failures, which is to be expected. Second, PoE still continues to outperform both Pbft and HotStuff, for the reasons described earlier. Third, these plots clearly show that PoE is more scalable than Pbft, as on 32 replicas HotStuff outperforms Pbft in both throughput and latency. Finally, the results of Zyzzyva help us to determine an upper bound for the maximum throughput attained by the system. Unlike previous experiments, in the no-failure case Zyzzyva requires each replica to just execute the request as soon as they receive a propose message from the primary. Hence, it achieves a higher throughput in comparison to PoE. However, the difference in throughput for PoE and Zyzzyva is small, that is, PoE has 7% (on 4 replicas) to 18% (on 16 replicas) less throughput than Zyzzyva. An interesting observation is that on 32 replicas, Zyzzyva incurs higher latency than PoE, even though it has higher throughput. This happens as clients in PoE have to wait for only the fastest nf = 22 replies, whereas a client for Zyzzyva has to wait for replies from all replicas (even the slowest ones). To conclude, PoE attains up to 47% more throughput (incurs 32% less latency) than Pbft and 2.5% more throughput (incurs 61% less latency) than HotStuff. This affirms our belief that PoE performs better than other protocols.
RELATED WORK
The approach of reverting decisions and redoing another transactions is a common problem in both database and distributed systems. Several concurrency control protocols [49] use this approach. In the domain of fault-tolerant consensus, Raft [81] also suggested that the log a replica holds can be over-written by the leader. However, Raft allows the leader to forcefully over-write logs of any replica. Although this approach works when handling crash-failures, such an approach affects safety when the leader can be malicious (byzantine).
Generally speaking, consensus is an age-old problem that received much theoretical and practical attention (see, e.g., [4, 8, 53, 64, 65, 69, 73, 87, 95, 103] ). The interest in practical bft consensus protocols [10, 13, 71] took off with the introduction of Pbft [15, 17] , the first practical well-performing consensus protocol. This led to several works [62, 63, 74, 108, 110] that try to improve the Pbft's design. Some of the interesting works in this direction include quorum-based approaches [1, 18, 25, 68, 72, 96] . For instance, Q/U tries to attain a single phase bft consensus, but needs 5f +1 replicas to handle just f byzantine failures and cannot handle concurrency. Its successor HQ [25] , can handle concurrency if none of the transactions are conflicting. Cowling et al. [96] present an approach that builds on top of HQ and handles conflicting operations, but requires an additional non-malicious entity, the preserializer.
Zyzzyva introduced speculative execution to bft consensus, this to achieve consensus in a single phase while only requiring 3f + 1 replicas to handle f byzantine failures. However, Zyzzyva's design requires no failures to achieve high throughput and requires reliable clients if the primary is malicious. Recent work [2] even showed that Zyzzyva is unsafe. There have been other works [32, 51, 93] that employ Zyzzyva's model and face similar limitations.
Some other bft protocols [6, 19, 24, 55, 67, 104] suggest the use of trusted components to reduce the cost of bft consensus. These works require only 2f + 1 replicas as the trusted component helps to guarantee a correct ordering. However, a trusted component can be compromised [84] and can act as a sink for different attacks.
In comparison to all these protocols, PoE does not: (i) require extra replicas, (ii) depend on clients, (iii) require trusted components, and (iv) does not need two phases of quadratic communication required by Pbft.
Consensus for Blockchain: Bitcoin [77] , the well-known cryptocurrency that popularized blockchains, employs the Proof-of-Work [52] consensus algorithm (PoW). Due to the limitations of PoW (being computationally intensive, while having low throughput and high latencies [27, 85, 105] ), several other similar algorithm have been suggested. Moreover, PoW can also cause forks (divergence) in the blockchain: separate chains can exist on non-faulty replicas, which in turn can cause double-spending attacks [47] .
Several variants of PoW have been proposed such as Proof-of-Stake [58] (PoS) and Proof-of-Space [5, 34] (PoC). PoS states that any replica owning n% of the total resources gets n% times opportunity to create new blocks. As PoS is resource driven, it can face attacks where replicas are incentivized to work simultaneously on several forks of the blokchain, without ever trying to eliminate these forks. PoC is a space variant to PoW, that is, it expects replicas to solve computational problems that require massive space.
Several works [36, 46, 90, 112] improve the throughput of Bitcoin through interesting optimizations. Bitcoin-NG [36] suggests selecting a leader using PoW algorithm and then the leader is assigned the task of generating a block. Byzcoin [59] , Ouroboros [57] and Hybrid Consensus [83] propose selecting a group of users that will run the consensus and create the next block. Hybrid consensus selects a group of replicas that will run PoW, while Ouroboros relies on PoS.
There are also a set of interesting alternative designs such as Ghost [99] , ConFlux [66] , Spectre [98] and MeshCash [7] that suggest the use of directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to store a blockchain to improve the performance of Bitcoin. However, these protocols still rely on PoW for consensus. Works like HoneyBadger [76] and Beat [33] provide bft consensus designs for fully asynchronous systems. Honeybadger has the same order of complexity as Pbft and has been shown to be even slower in some cases. Beat presents a suite of algorithms from which users can select according to their needs. Further, Beat applies techniques such as erasure codes and fingerprint checksums to bft protocols, this to reduce message size and computational work. Note that most of the blockchain consensus designs that we have seen till now still have very low throughput, not more than 10K txns/s, and usually much lower.
Elastico [70] , RapidChain [113] , Monoxide [106] and AHL [26] suggest use of sharding instead of replication for maintaining the blockchain. Elastico requires the PoW algorithm to decide which replicas can process transactions, while Monoxide requires either PoW or PoS for achieving consensus on a block. RapidChain uses randomization to select a small set of processing replicas, improving performance, but it requires strong synchronous communication among its selected set of replicas, an unrealistic assumption. To further enable the design and implementation of complex sharded bft systems, we recently proposed a specialized high-performance faulttolerant communication primitive that enables efficient communication between shards [50] . Algorand [41] introduces probabilistic bft algorithms and defines several high probability estimates for attaining fast consensus. However, in the worse case, Algorand can create forks and is susceptible to nothing-at-stake attack [113] .
PoE does not face the limitations faced by PoW [52] , PoS [58] and PoC [34] , for which several attacks have been shown [28, 37, 101] . The use of DAGs [7, 66, 98, 99] , erasure codes and checksums [33, 76] , and sharding [70, 113] is orthogonal to the design of PoE. Hence, their use with PoE can reap further benefits.
CONCLUSIONS
We present Proof-of-Execution (PoE), a novel Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus protocol that guarantees safety and liveness and does so in only two phases. PoE decouples ordering from execution by allowing replicas to process messages out-of-order and execute client-transactions speculatively. Despite these properties, PoE ensures that all the replicas reach a single unique order for all the transactions. Further, PoE guarantees that if a client observes identical results of execution from a majority of the replicas, then it can reliably mark its transaction complete. Due to speculative execution, PoE may require replicas to revert executed transactions, however. We envision PoE to be used at the core of blockchain databases, thereby increasing their throughput. To support this vision, we implemented PoE in our prototype blockchain database framework-ResilientDB-showing that PoE is not only safe and live, but also achieves up to 86% more throughput than existing state-of-the-art bft protocols.
